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COLLISION COURSE: PUBLIC INQUIRIES
AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
DAVID

T.S.

FRASERt

Public inquiries have become entrenched as an important part of the
Canadian administrative state. Public inquiries are given numerous
powers to execute their fact-finding missions-powers that sometimes
collide with the rights of individuals. In ordinary criminal
investigations, those suspected of having committed offences have the
right to remain silent and to refuse to participate in their own
conviction. Recent inquiries, most notably the Westray Inquiry, have
been charged with investigating tragedies where criminal charges may
be appropriate. This has raised important questions regarding the
power of inquiries to compel all relevant testimony and "name names"
where this may collide with the rights ofaccuseds to remain silent and to
a fair trial. This article examines the most recent jurisprudence
surrounding the intersection between public inquiries and criminal
investigations. The author examines the present law of individual
compellability and the subsequent use ofderivative evidence that comes
to light in the inquiry process. Examples from other jurisdictions are
invoked to determine the proper method for balancing the public
interest served by powerfitl fact-finding institutions and the right of
accuseds to remain silent.
Les enquetes publiques representent aujourd 'hui une partie importante
de! 'administration Canadienne. Elles possedent de nombreux pouvoirs
afin d'effectuer leurs missions de recherches factuelles; ces pouvoirs
etant parfois en conflit avec les droits personnels des individus. Dans
!es enquetes criminelles ordinaires, les individus soupconnes d'avoir
commis des offenses ant le droit de garder silence et de refuser de
participer a leur propre condamnation. Des enquetes recentes
t B.A. (Hons.) (British Columbia), M.A. (St. Mary's), LL.B anticipated 1999
(Dalhousie). The author wishes to thank Mr. John Merrick, Q.C., for his invaluable assistance
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(notamment, l'enquete Westray) ont ete chargees d'examiner les
tragedies ou des charges criminelles seraient appropriees. Ceci a
souleve d 'importants questionnements au sujet des pouvoirs accordes
aux enquetes de soumettre tout temoignage pertinent et de reveler des
noms, et ce, dans un contexte ou le droit de !'accuse de demeurer
silencieux et le droit a un
Juste et equitable peuvent entrer en
conjlit. Le present article examine la jurisprudence la plus recente
concernant le croisement des enquetes publiques et des enquetes
criminelles. L 'auteur examine le droit actuel concernant la contrainte
individuelle ainsi que I 'usage ulterieur de la preuve derivee obtenue a
la lumiere du processus d'enquete. Une comparaison d'examples
d 'autres juridictions permet de determiner la methode appropriee, afin
de balancer l 'interet public servi par les puissantes institutions de
recherche de faits et par le droit des suspects de demeurer silencieux.

An explosion at the Westray Mine in Plymouth, Nova Scotia on May 9,
1992 killed twenty-six men working underground. Within a week, the
Nova Scotia government appointed Supreme Comi Justice K. Peter
Richard as a commissioner under the Public Inquiries Act 1 and as a
Special Examiner under the Coal Mines Regulation Act. 2 The Westray
Commission of Inquiry had a broad mandate to investigate virtually all
aspects of the tragedy, including whether it was preventable and
whether it was occasioned by neglect. 3
On October 5, 1992, fifty-two charges under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act 4 and the Coal Mines Regulation Act 5 were laid
against Gerald Phillips, Roger Pany, Glyn Jones, Robert Pany, and
Curragh Resources Inc. The mine managers challenged the inquiry in
the courts and, just over a month later, Glube C.J.T.D. held that the
Inquiry's mandate was ultra vires the province of Nova Scotia. 6 This

R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 372.
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 73.
3
N.S. 0.I.C. No. 92-504.
4
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 320 [hereinafter O.H.S.A.].
5 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 73.
6
Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of !11qui1y into the Westray Mine Tragedy) (1993),
116 N.S.R. (2d) 34, [1992] N.S.J. No. 451 (S.C.) (QL) [hereinafter Phillips (N.S.S.C. No. 2)
cited to N.S.R.].
I

2
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judgment was appealed, and on January 19, 1993, the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal reversed the specific vires holding of Glube C.J.T.D. 7 Hallet
J.A., writing for the Court, did not stop there. He considered the
arguments of the accuseds, who contended that the work of the Inquiry
jeopardized their section 7 rights under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 8 Hallet J.A. agreed and held that the rights of the accuseds
must prevail over public and state interest in the expedient work of the
Inquiry. The Court ordered a stay of the Inquiry's proceedings until
either trial, pleading or stay resolved all provincial charges. At that
point, no criminal charges had been laid.
Not surprisingly, the decision of the Court of Appeal was again
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In the intervening time, the
O.H.S.A. and Coal Mines Regulation Act charges were stayed by the
Attorney General in preference of charges for criminal negligence.
After the hearing but before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision
was released, the accuseds (Gerald Phillips, Roger Parry, and Curragh)
elected to be tried by judge alone.
This action, in the judgment of a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada, rendered the accuseds' Charter arguments moot. 9 Sopinka J.
wrote that the danger to the accuseds' Charter rights stemmed from the
problem of adverse publicity prejudicing their right to a fair trial by jury.
As the issue was moot, the majority of the Court declined to consider the
Charter arguments. In two minority judgments, L'Heureux-Dube and
Cory JJ. considered the issues. Both would have upheld the Inquiry's
appeal. However, all recognized that much of the issue was moot by the
time the decision was written, although Cory J. noted that since there
was a parallel criminal process operating, it was still a "live issue." 10
The travails of the Westray Inquiry are not unique in recent
Canadian history. The Krever Inquiry into the tainted blood tragedy was

7 Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquily into the Westray Mine Tragedy) (1993),
117 N.S.R. (2d) 218, [1993] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) [hereinafter Phillips (N.S.C.A.) cited
to N.S.R.].
8
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
9
Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission ofInquily into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2
S.C.R. 97, [1995] S.C.J. No. 36 [hereinafter Phillips (S.C.C.) cited to S.C.R.].
10
Ibid., at para 73.

PUBLIC INQUIRIES AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS - 59

hounded by litigation on evidentiary matters, 11 as was the Somalia
Commission. 12 The work of these inquiries-each investigating areas of
public interest with the possibility of criminal culpability for the actions
investigated-has been slowed and almost stopped by accuseds,
potential accuseds, and suspects. However, these most recent examples
do not appear to have significantly undercut the role of inquiries. In fact,
inquiries are recognized for their ability to ferret out the truth in ways
that civil or criminal trials cannot. 13 Normal rules of evidence,
developed over years with the rights of the criminally accused in mind,
do not apply. 14 Firm procedural practices built up over centuries of
criminal prosecutions are not strictly adhered to. 15 Public inquiries
generally have one purpose: to investigate and repo1i facts, and report
upon systemic and collective problems, usually within governments.
The very wide focus and the unrestricted analysis mean that unlike a
criminal or civil trial, an inquiry can "get to the root" of fundamental,
systemic, and social issues. However, an inqui1y's broad grant of power
and its public nature raise problems for the rights of accuseds and
potential accuseds.
Despite an enonnous amount of litigation and some scholarly
comment, questions remain. The Nova Scotia Comi of Appeal held that
the public interest in, and the concomitant media coverage of, the
II See Canada (A.G.) v. Canada (Commission ofinquiry on the Blood System in Canada
Krever Commission), [1997] S.C.J. No. 83 (QL), affg [1997] F.C.J. No. 17 (C.A.) (QL), var'g
[1996] F.C.J. No. 864 (T.D.) (QL).
Il See Labbe v. Canada (Commission ofInquily into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in
Somalia}, [1997 F.C.J. No. 107 (T.D.) (QL); Addy v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 796 (T.D.)
(QL); Beno v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 936 (T.D.) (QL), rev'd [1997] F.C.J. No. 509 (C.A.)
(QL); Boyle v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 942 (T.D.) (QL); Beno v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No.
535 (T.D.) (QL).
I 3 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Administrative Law: Commissions of Jnquily
Working Paper 17 (Ottawa: 1977); Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Public
Inquiries (Toronto: 1992); Alberta Law Reform Institute, Proposals for the Reform of the
Public Inquiries Act Report No. 62 (Edmonton: 1992); Canadian Press, "Abuse victims call
for inquiry" (27 April 1997 21:06) DB CP97 (QL).
4
I Re Huston (1922), 52 O.L.R. 444 (Ont. C.A.) (holding that commissioner is not bound by
rules of admissibility in court); Bortolotti v. Ontario (Minist1y of Housing) (1977), 15 0.R.
(2d) 617 (Ont. C.A.) (holding that all reasonably relevant evidence is admissible; only
exclusionary rule is privilege).
Is R. v. Gunn, [1977] 1 F.C. 125 (T.D.) (procedure is within the discretion of the
commissioner); Silberberg v. Caron, [1951] Que. S.C. 131 (Quebec Code of Civil Procedure
does not apply unless it specifically is so stated in the statute).
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Westray Inquiry would prejudice the defendants' section 11 (d) Charter
rights regardless of whether the accuseds testified. The solution was a
stay of the inquiry's process. But what about charges and potential
suspects who only come to light through the process of the inquiry? Is it
unrealistic to expect a "start-stop" process as the potentially culpable
emerge?
If parallel inquiries and penal processes are potentially too
problematic, should an either/or regime be in place? Should the
commissioner or cabinet be forced to decide on either pursuing an
inquiry or criminal charges? This approach is also questionable. Even
without the threat of penal or civil culpability, a finding of facts by the
public inquiry has the potential to destroy the reputation of a person who
is left with no avenue of appeal. In camera hearings and bans on
publication of findings have also been suggested. These, however,
destroy the public nature of the exercise and undermine an inquiry's
reason for being.
The ability of inquiries to "name names," both through the hearings
and in final reports, has been a large issue for those facing potential
criminal charges or civil suits. A mandate to find facts will often lead to
the finding of facts that are adverse to the interests of parties. A
collection of facts will often amount to a civil cause of action, the
elements of a criminal offence, or just enough unfavourable testimony
to discredit an individual in his or her community. Does a restriction on
naming names hobble an inquiry, or is it a necessary element of the
balancing refeffed to earlier?

I. RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN CONFLICT

A public inquiry can be categorised based on the overall objectives of
each paiiicular undertaking. On one hand are the very broad policysetting inquiries such as the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission on
Bilingualism 16 or the Gordon Commission on Canada's Economic
Prospects. 17 On the other hand are inquiries chartered with a fact-finding
16
Royal Commission 011 Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1967).
17
Royal Commission 011 Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1958)
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function, such as the Grange Commission. 18 Many inquiries-such as
the Marshall Commission 19-are hybrids, focusing their inquisition on
mixed fact and policy.
Neither federal nor provincial public inquiries can establish guilt or
innocence in the criminal law sense. 20 Nor can they establish civil
liability. Instead, this category is often composed of fact-finding
undertakings that consequentially establish a pattern of facts that can
give rise to either criminal or civil culpability.
As creatures of executive (or royal) charters, one might think of
inquiries as tools of the executive branch of government. The
prevalence of judges as commissioners and the quasi-judicial fo1mality
employed suggest a judicial role. Furthermore, the public nature of the
inquiry and the strong independence of the judiciary remove inquiries
from the ebb and flow of Canadian politics. The trappings of both
branches are apparent in most-if not all-inquiries. Generally with one
foot in each arena, inquiries are sui generis within the traditional
conception of parliamentary government.
The rights protected and the interests served by public inquiries
and public prosecutions are by and large similar: the underlying premise
is the furtherance of a public interest. Public inquiries are charged with
the investigation of certain actions and with producing independent
recommendations of remedial policy. Criminal prosecutions, on the
other hand, serve the public interest of deterrence and punishment of
criminally culpable behaviour. Private actions-those between
individuals-often intersect with criminal prosecutions in that the two
proceedings can erupt from the same set of facts. For example, an
injurious car accident may simultaneously give rise to a criminal charge
of reckless driving and a private action for personal injury and property
damage. As far as the accused is concerned, the parallel processes can
present a conflict as the accused might be forced to testify in the civil
matter. In the criminal trial, however, the accused cannot be compelled
to give evidence. For criminal prosecutions and public inquiries, the
Nelles v. Grange (1984), 3 O.A.C. 40, 9 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (C.A.).
Royal Commission on the Donald Marhsall, Jr., Prosecution, Commissioners' Report:
Findings and Recommendations (Halifax: 1989).
2
° For a federal inquiry it would not be ultra vires constitutionally, but federal
commissions are, in practice, precluded from making such findings.
18

19
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conflict is no less real but it is less clear which should prevail: both are
actions by government agents acting in a clear public interest.
The question of what to do with the apparent conflict between
inqui1ies and criminal prosecutions is the subject of this paper. Despite
the large amount of litigation and study in this area, it is a question with
considerable murkiness and the appellate courts have not conclusively
answered the questions.
1. Charter Sections 13 and 7-Self-Incrimination and the Right to
Silence
i. Generally
Inquiries that are founded to look into alleged misconduct have at their
disposal a very powerful tool: the ability to subpoena persons and to
compel their testimony. A person who is subject to criminal charges
arising from the res of an inquiry is put in a very precarious position
when his or her testimony is compelled.
The criminal process, in contrast with an inqui1y's process, offers
many protections to the rights of accuseds. In fact, the presumption of
innocence and the right to silence are built upon the premise that the
defendant can sit idly by while the Crown bears the complete burden of
building and proving its case. Many of the fundamental legal rights
enjoyed in Canada are built upon the foundation that the Crown cannot
force an individual to participate in his own prosecution. The "case to
meet" model is the cornerstone of the adversarial system:
In a civilized society that operates under the adversarial system of
justice, a person should not be put in the position of explaining his or
her actions until the state has shown that there is something that
demands explanation according to the accepted rules of the society.
Moreover, a person should not be subject to penalty by the state until
the state has proven its right to punish at a high enough level to be
beyond question. 21

An accused is under no obligation to make any statements to the Crown,
nor can the Crown compel statements of others as part of its
investigations. A public inqui1y, however, purports to be able to do
21
M.A. Stalker, "The Protection of Individual Rights and The Public Inqui1y" (1994) 43
U.N.B. L.J. 427 at 429.
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both: those under suspicion or charged are compellable witnesses and
the inquiry can compel the production of statements and real evidence.
In stark contrast to a police investigation, the public inquiry has much
greater powers and an increased ability to jeopardize an accused,
primarily by compelling his or her testimony. The danger this presents is
evident, as there is always a risk that a public inquiry may be a
colourable attempt to be a "super investigation" or a "super preliminary
hearing." 22
It does not take much creativity of thought to imagine a situation
where an inquiry is proceeding concurrently with a police investigation,
and the police are stymied by their inability to compel the attendance of
suspects and witnesses. The inqui1y, meanwhile, has subpoenaed those
same witnesses and suspects. The process of the inqui1y would be
followed with great interest and would likely provide the police with
helpful leads. Compelling the testimony from a potential suspect would
clearly have the effect of providing the police with assistance that the
suspect ordinarily would have an absolute right to refuse. Thus,
intentionally or not, there is the danger that an inquiry may be used as a
venue for compelled interrogation for a criminal investigation. 23
Compared with the American regime, 24 Canadian law has
historically been less generous to the witness. There is no right to refuse
to answer an inquiry's questions that would tend to self-incriminate.
Section 13 of the Charter reads:
13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to
have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate
Beyond endangering the rights of accused persons, a "super preliminary investigation"
under the guise of a provincial inquiry will not stand for jurisdictional reasons as it will
infringe the federal government's criminal law powers under the Constitution. Such was the
case in Starr v. Houlden, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1366 [hereinafter Starr].
23
As an example, it is worthwhile to note that during the Westray Inquiry, the R.C.M.P.,
who were concurrently unde1iaking a criminal investigation, took advantage of the Inquiry's
collection of documentation relevant to the tragedy. Once the Inquiry had amassed the
collection, the R.C.M.P. served search warrants to gain access to it. Probably an inevitable
incident of a parallel process, Inquiry officers quite rightly feared that the whole exchange
might give the appearance that the Inquiry was cooperating and "feeding" the criminal
investigation. This perception was part of the applicants' argument before the Supreme Court
of Canada. See Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9 at 180. It should be borne in mind that this
example was the compulsion of documentary evidence, a process that is distinct from
compelling oral testimony from an accused.
24
See the section entitled "United States," below.
22
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that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for
perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence.

The Canada Evidence Act goes hand-in-hand with the Charter:
5. (1) No witness shall be excused from answering any question on
the ground that the answer to the question may tend to
criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability to a civil
proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person.
(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer
on the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him, or
may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the
instance of the Crown or of any person, and if but for this Act,
or the Act of any provincial legislature, the witness would
therefore have been excused from answering the question, then
although the witness is by reason of this Act or the provincial
Act compelled to answer, the answer so given shall not be used
or admissible in evidence against him in any criminal trial or
other criminal proceeding against him thereafter taking place,
other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of that
evidence. [emphasis added]2 5

The Canadian solution is to compel the testimony in the first instance
and allow limited protections later.
A right to prevent the subsequent use of compelled self-incriminating
testimony protects the individual from being "conscripted against
himself' without simultaneously denying an investigator's access to
relevant information. It strikes a just and proper balance between the
interests of the individual and the state. 26

It would appear clear from the applicable statutes that the evidence
given at the inquiry would not subsequently be used against that
witness, but some obscurity remains and two important questions are
umesolved.
First, the extremely public nature of the inquiry process would
make any testimony given notorious. Routine criminal or civil trials are
not surrounded by intense media interest and a general prohibition like
section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act may be effective in keeping
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 5. The Nova Scotia Evidence Act, R.S.N.S.
1989, c. 154, s. 59, has virtually identical provisions.
26
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Director of Investigations and Research), [1990]
S.C.R. 425 at 541, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23 per La Forest J. [hereinafter Thomson].
25
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prior testimony out of the courtroom. However, public inquiries are not
routine. If compelled testimony is particularly harmful to the interests of
the witness, it may cause considerable prejudice among the public at
large, undermining the ability to empanel an unbiased jury and generally
destroying the reputation of the witness. Secondly, the Evidence Act is
silent with regard to the use of derivative evidence.
As far as the question of compellability of testimony is concerned,
Iacobucci J. 's conclusion in S. (R.J) is helpful:
Indeed, it is clear that Canada repeatedly resolved to maintain a
position whereby witnesses are able to claim a protective mechanism
which admits of certain application and which has a defined reach.
While the longevity of the Canada Evidence Act approach is perhaps
not a determinative consideration, its longevity has particular
significance when one considers that the Canadian position has been
the subject of unending scrutiny which it has always survived. The
considered opinion of the legal community in this country has
repeatedly advocated its retention.27

As has been the trend in other areas of evidence, the question of selfincrimination before public inquiries would benefit greatly from a
principled approach. 28 The question of whether to admit (or compel)
evidence is a matter of balancing two important values. On one hand,
there is a clear public interest in getting all relevant evidence before an
inquiry that requires it and, on the other hand, there is a public interest
clearly stated in sections 7 and 11 (d) of the Charter expressing the right
of an accused to a fair trial.
As the immediate authority over the fairness of an inquiry's
proceedings, it is the responsibility of the commissioner to ensure that
the proceeding is fair and that those appearing before it are not subjected
to unfair prejudice. The best detenninants of this are the principles
expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Branch 29 and S. (R.J). 30
The commissioner would be required to balance the public interest
27

R. v. S.(R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, [1995] S.C.J. No. 10 at para 135 [hereinafter S.(R.J)].
A prime example is the movement away from strict, unbending rules to a more principled
approach where trial judges are to return to first principles is the area of hearsay evidence and
pigeon-holed exceptions. The Supreme Court of Canada dispensed with the artificial
categories and thoroughly modernized the law of hearsay in R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531
and in R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915.
29
British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3.
30
S.(R.J.), supra note 27.
28
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served by the inquiry and the necessity of the witness' testimony against
the possibility of prejudice to the fair trial rights of that witness. Thus, if
the commissioner can fulfil the mandate of the inquiry without the
testimony of that particular witness, the necessity of compelling
testimony is not acute. 31 On the other hand, ifthat testimony is central to
the inquiry's mandate and necessary for the functioning of the
proceeding, then it must be asked what prejudicial effect the testimony
might have. If the prejudice would be substantial and cannot be
mitigated, then the balancing weighs against compelling that witness.
This balancing act is not one that lends itself to easy expression or cold
calculation, but it is a technique judges have become deft at applying. 32
It is a question that should be asked at every tum when the issue of
compelling evidence rears its head. When an inquiry's subpoena is
challenged, the commissioner should be considering the importance and
the value of the subpoenaed party's evidence and balancing it against
the likelihood and magnitude of prejudice that might result from the
admission of that person's evidence. Nevertheless, considering
prejudice is a speculation at that point, and the hurdle must be set high.
The presumption in such cases would be in favour of admission and the
subpoenaed party would have the burden of arguing the likelihood of
prejudice. If the decision is made to compel the person's testimony, they
shall have a further option to request a remedy from the courts at the
time of their preliminary hearing or ultimate trial. The test then would be
whether the testimony given at the inquiry and the accompanying
publicity has adversely affected the accused's right to a fair trial. At that
point, the trial judge would be in a better position to evaluate the
possible prejudice suffered by the accused.
ii. Derivative evidence
The general prohibition against the later use of a person's compelled
testimony prevents the state from having the benefit of that person's
3 ' It is interesting to note that the Westray Inquiry was able to produce a report that was very
well received without the benefit of testimony from those who were charged criminally. While
their testimony would have been an obvious benefit to the Inquiry, the absence did little to
undermine the report's credibility.
32 Judges have shown their ability to reasonably and effectively use "principled
approaches" to admissibility. See, generally, cases following Khan, supra note 28, and Smith,
supra note 28: R. v. Eisehnauer (1998), 165 N.S.R. (2d) 81 (C.A.) and R. v. Sterling (1995),
102 C.C.C. (3d) 481.
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assistance in a venue where testimony is not compellable. However, the
witness does not have the same degree of protection when it comes to
derivative evidence.
The law of derivative evidence in the United States is extremely
pro-witness. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an
exclusionary rule under which evidence that is derived from an
inadmissible source (generally a search found to be unconstitutional) is
excluded as being tainted by its source. 33 In the inquiry context, the
exclusionary rule has been codified through the so-called "use and
derivative use" statute. 34 In Canada, however, the independent existence
of the evidence is not a consideration.
In Canada, most of the jurisprudence surrounding derivative
evidence comes from illegal interceptions of private conversations. 35 By
statute, the Criminal Code provides that derivative evidence in such
situations is primafacie admissible unless "the admission thereof would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute." 36 The common law
and constitutional jurisprudence in Canada do not afford accuseds or
potential accuseds a similar degree of protection as that offered in the
United States:
The test for exclusion of derivative evidence involves the question
whether the evidence could have been obtained but for the witness's
testimony and required an inquiry into logical probabilities, not mere
possibilities. The important consideration is whether the evidence,
practically speaking, could have been located. Logic must be applied
to the facts of each case, not to the mere fact of independent existence.
There should be no automatic rule of exclusion in respect of any
derivative evidence. Its exclusion ought to be governed by the trial
judge's discretion. The exercise of the trial judge's discretion will
depend upon the probative effect of the evidence balanced against the
prejudice caused to the accused by its admission. The burden is on the
accused to demonstrate that the proposed evidence is derivative
evidence deserving of a limited immunity protection. 37
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471; Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d
840 at 865.
34
18 U.S.C. § 6002.
35 See e.g. R. v. Parsons (1977), 17 0.R. (2d) 465, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 430 (C.A.); R. v.
Dennison (1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 510, 6 0.A.C. 235 (C.A.); R. v. Samson (No. 5) (1982), 37
O.R. (2d) 42 (Co. Ct.); R. v. Li (No. 2), [1976] 6 W.W.R. 146 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
36
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 189(2).
37
S.(R.J.), supra note 27 [Quotation from the S.C.R. headnote].
33
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Iacobucci J. founded this reasoning under the Charter's protection
against self-incrimination. La Forest J., in Thomson Newspapers, 38
rooted a similar principle in the common law duty of judges to protect a
fair trial by excluding evidence by balancing prejudicial effect and
probative value:
[D]erivative evidence that could not have been found or appreciated
except as a result of the compelled testimony ... should in the exercise
of the trial judge's discretion be excluded since its admission would
violate the principles of fundamental justice. 39

In Canada, the admission of derivative evidence is a matter of the trial
judge's discretion and both Iacobucci and La Forest JJ. describe a
straightforward, principled test for the exercise of that discretion.
Unfortunately, however, it is wanting in the inquiry context.
Unlike a criminal or civil trial, inquiry mandates are very broad in
scope and inquiry counsel have much wider latitude in the interrogation
of witnesses. Where prosecutors must confine their questioning to
matters that are relevant to the immediate charge, inquiries are on a
mission to uncover facts and the elements that underlie them. Strict
procedural limitations on the scope of a commissioner's inquiry would
undermine much of the effectiveness of the institution. This, however,
increases the danger that inquiries might venture into the grey area of
substitute police investigation. 40 Although the exact words of the
witness may not be admissible later, that person's testimony would be a
valuable source-to use Wigmore's phrase-of "clue facts": "[a fact]
which increases the probability that a subordinate fact will be
discovered and thus that an ultimate fact, and the crime, will be
proved."41 Inquiry counsel, wittingly or not, will be in the role of
compelling the witness to produce testimony and clues of substantial
benefit to the Crown.
This was a substantial part of the submission made in favour of an
injunction to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Phillips v. Nova
Thomson, supra note 26.
Ibid. at 561.
4 ° For an example of an inquiry stayed as a "substitute police investigation," see Starr,
supra note 22.
41 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence at Trials at Common Law vol. 8, J.T. McNaughton, rev.
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961) §2260 at 371; cited in S.(R.J.), supra note 27 at para 58
per Iacobucci J.
38
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Scotia. 42 At the time that the application was made, the Westray Inquiry
was just beginning and criminal investigations were ongoing. The mine
managers were fearful that the combination of the police investigation
and the parallel inquiry would amount to a super-investigation that
would significantly compromise their rights. Compelled testimony
before the inquiry would provide substantial derivative evidence to the
police without any of the normal procedural protections. Glube
C.J.T.D., in chambers, granted the complainants' application for a
temporary order prohibiting the inquiry from commencing its public
hearings on the basis that there was a serious question of constitutional
jurisdiction and the balance of convenience was in the complainants'
favour. 43 Later, Glube C.J.T.D. made the temporary stay pe1manent on
the basis that the inquiry was ultra vires the province of Nova Scotia as
it "encroache[d] on the Federal criminal law and procedure powers
pursuant to section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 [sic]. " 44
The argument that the Order-in-Council infringed the section 7, 8,
and 11 (d) rights of the applicants was dismissed as the matter was
disposed of with the ultra vires holding. However, Glube C.J.T.D. did
consider the Charter issues in obiter.
An inquiry, although not a trial, is a proceeding. The issue is, what can
be made of compelled testimony in another proceeding? Section 13 of
the Charter would protect against the use of the evidence of a witness
who testifies at the Westray Inquiry from being used to incriminate
that same person in another proceeding. The main concern, however,
is derivative evidence. By allowing the Westray Inquiry to continue
under its present terms of reference, both the Department of Labour
and the R.C.M.P. could become the beneficiary of derivative evidence
without being obliged to pursue their options of obtaining warrants.
This has been mentioned previously under division of powers. Both
the police and the Department could obtain evidence which would not
be available to them in an ordinary investigation.
I am inclined to the view that under the existing terms of reference,
there could be a Charter violation of the applicants [sic] right to
silence upon being compelled to testify at the Westray Inquiry,

42
Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquily into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1992]
N.S.J. No. 391, 116 N.S.R. (2d) 30, 8 Admin. L.R. (2d) 107 (S.C.) [hereinafter Phillips
(N.S.S.C. No. 1) cited to N.S.R.]
43
Phillips (N.S.S.C. No. 2), supra note 6 at 60-61.
44
Phillips (N.S.S.C. No. !), supra note 42 at 45.
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particularly if derivative evidence was elicited .... It is very uncertain
what derivative evidence there is, if any. I am also not prepared to say
that obtaining derivative evidence through compelled testimony
would automatically mean that there was a Charter violation which
could be successful against the Westray Inquiry. [emphasis added] 45

When Glube C.J.T.D.'s judgment was appealed, the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal overturned her holding that the inquiry was ultra vires
the provincial government. However, Hallett J.A., continued the stay by
considering the Charter issues that Glube C.J.T.D. had only considered
in obiter. Hallett J.A. considered the leading cases of Starr 46 and
Thomson Newspapers 47 and adopted a position that approximates the
strong dissenting opinions of Wilson and Sopinka JJ. in Thomson:
[I]n their opinions the power to compel testimony under the Combines
Investigation Act at the investigative stage infringed s. 7 Charter rights
for the reason that persons compelled to respond to orders testify
issued under the authority of the Act were not accorded the nonnal
protections afforded to persons who are being investigated for
suspected offences that carry penal consequences. 48

Hallett J.A. also favourably considered the reasoning of Professor
Edward Ratushny in his argument that an accused's interests can be
seriously compromised by a compulsion to testify at another hearing:
The earlier hearing might be used as a "fishing expedition" to subject
the witness to extensive questioning with a view to uncovering
possible criminal conduct. The questioning might also be used to
investigate a particular offence. For example, the accused might be
required to reveal possible defences, the names of potential defence
witnesses and other evidence. Moreover, the publicity generated by
the hearing may seriously prejudice the likelihood of a fair trial.
The problem is that the initial hearing is likely to have none of the
protections guaranteed by the criminal process. There will be no
specific accusation, no presumption of innocence, no protections
against prejudicial publicity, no rules of evidence and so on. It is
submitted that there is a serious crisis of integrity in a criminal process

Phillips (N.S.S.C. No. 2), supra note 6.
Starr, supra note 22.
47
Thomson, supra note 26.
48
Phillips (N.S.C.A.), supra note 7 at 236, interpretation of Thomson, supra note 26 per
Hallett J.A.
45

46
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whose detailed protections may so easily be ignored. Nor are these
merely theoretical problems. 49

Justice Hallett finally concluded that the peril to the accuseds' interests
would be dislodged by the adoption of a regime similar to those that
prevail in the United Kingdom and the United States: full immunity for
those who are being investigated by inquiries.
On further appeal to the Supreme Court ofCanada, 50 the majority 51
held that the foundation for the complaint had disappeared once the
accuseds elected to be tried by judge alone. The majority of the Court
declined to consider the question of compellability as it was premature.
A minority 52 held that the existing Charter jurisprudence of sections
1 l(d), 13, and 7 provide sufficient protection for the accuseds.
Furthermore, the rule from R. v. S. (R.J) 53 protects them from the use of
derivative evidence.
L'Heureux-Dube J. reiterated her test from S.(R.J) based on
"fundamentally unfair" conduct on the part of the Crown:
Fundamentally unfair conduct will most frequently occur when the
Crown is seeking, as its predominant purpose (rather than
incidentally), to build or advance its case against that witness instead
of acting in furtherance of those pressing and substantial purposes
validly within the jurisdiction of the body compelling the testimony.
The Crown will be predominantly advancing its case against the
accused when, by calling the witness, it is engaging in a colourable
attempt to obtain discovery from the accused and, at the same time, is
not materially advancing its own valid purposes. Such action would
bypass the safeguards to the dignity of the individual under the
Charter and fundamentally undermine the integrity of the judicial
system. The principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 do not allow
the state to have a general power of interrogation, that is, to permit the
state to pass a law requiring all suspected persons to answer pre-trial
questions, even if such a law prevented the later use of those
statements at trial. 54
49
E. Ratushny, "The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process" in W.S. Tarnopolsky &
G.A. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms: Commentmy (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982) at 364-5 quoted in Phillips (N.S.C.A.), supra note 7 at 245 and Phillips
(S.C.C.), supra note 9 at 146.
50
Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9.
51
Per Lamer, C.J., La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, and McLachlin JJ.
52
Per Cory, Iacobucci, and Major JJ.
53
Supra note 2 7.
54
S.(R.J), supra note 27 at 608-9, quoted in Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9 at 120.
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The protection espoused by L'Heureux-Dube J. would be activated
either during questioning before the inquiry or at trial. Derivative
evidence elicited during the inquiry would be subject to the S. (R.J.) test.
With respect, in a situation like the Westray Inquiry where the
questions put to the managers would almost completely overlap with the
facts sought by the police, the effect of the questioning would be
identical to that which would occur if the Crown were to question the
accuseds with the primary-and fundamentally unfair-purpose of
building its case. An investigative inquiry has an obvious interest in and
right to hear the facts that will be elicited, but ultimately the effect upon
the accused will be the same as ifhe or she was directly inten-ogated by
the police. The inten-ogation before a public inquiry is completely
unlike the context of overheard conversations and illegally obtained
confessions. The accused is being involuntarily enlisted in an
investigation that might very well lead to his conviction. A presumption
of admissibility coupled with placing the onus upon the accused to
prove that the information could not have been found but for the
derivative evidence is contrary to the principles underlying sections 7
and 13. Fairness to the accused would require that the onus be placed
upon the Crown to prove not only that the evidence they propose to
admit could have been found absent the accused's testimony, but that it
would have been found. This satisfies the requirements to get all
relevant testimony before the inqui1y without unduly prejudicing the
rights and interests of the accused.

2. Section ll(d)-Part I
Implicit in the findings of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Phillips is that the right to a fair trial is not compromised by the
publicitiy of potentially incriminating testimony if the accused is not
being tried by a jury. Because the Westray managers had elected to be
tried by a judge alone, the majority found that the basis of the appeal to
the Supreme Court had disappeared. 55 The Court was unanimous in
outcome, but only four members of the Court considered the substantive
issues raised in the appeal. 56 Cory J. 's opinion thoroughly canvassed the

55
56

Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9 at 110.
Cory, Iacobucci, Major, and L'Heureux-Dube JJ.
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issues raised with regard to the publication of adverse evidence and its
possible impact upon the accused's section 1 l(d) right to a fair trial.
There certainly exists the possibility that a judge may be influenced
subconsciously by notorious public hearings, but the Court found
nothing in the record to even consider this possibility. It would be
illogical to hold in a system where the trial judge can supervise a voir
dire, find evidence inadmissible and then judge the case-supposedly
minus the inadmissible evidence-that the judge must not even be
exposed to inadmissible evidence. This seems clear, though the subject
would have benefited from a more probing analysis from the country's
top court.
The situation, however, is radically different when the accused is
being tried by judge and jury. Only the minority concuning judgments
from Phillips consider this in any depth, but their reasoning is very
instructive. Cory J. noted that the threshold for an injunction to restrain
the operation of an inquiry in anticipation of a possible Charter breach
later on is a high one: "relief will only be granted in circumstances
where the claimant is able to prove that there is a sufficiently serious risk
that the alleged violation will in fact occur." 57 This balancing involves
considering, on one hand, that the right to a fair trial is the foundation
upon which our justice system has been built. On the other hand, Cory J.
observed that the "applicant will always have the opportunity to apply
for relief at the trial court once the prejudice, flowing, for example, from
the publicity, is more easily asce1iainable and demonstrable." 58
The danger to the rights of the accused, generally, comes not from
the inquiry itself but from the publicity and media attention sunounding
it. The danger can be mitigated, almost eliminated, by a publication ban
on an inquiry's proceedings, but as Cory J. observed, such a ban would
completely undermine the inquiry:
the public is much more likely to have confidence in an open system.
The benefits of openness are not restricted to the criminal justice
system but appiy as well to civil proceedings: Edmonton Journal v.
Alberta (Attorney General) .... The conduct of a public inquiry is no
different, although it may differ from a criminal trial in that the inquiry
process itself may be more important than the result.

57

58

Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9 at 158.
Ibid. at 159.
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Open hearings function as a means of restoring the public confidence
in the affected industry and in the regulations pertaining to it and their
enforcement. As well, it can serve as a type of healing therapy for a
community shocked and angered by a tragedy. It can channel the
natural desire to assign blame and exact retribution into a constructive
exercise providing recommendations for reform and improvement.
[emphasis added] 59

There is a high premium placed upon open hearings and the
presumption in favour of openness should only be dislodged in very
clear cases. At the same time, there exists a presumption that juries are
composed of capable and intelligent citizens who can discharge their
duties fairly.
The solemnity of the juror's oath, the existence of procedures such as
change of venue and challenge for cause, and the careful attention
which jurors pay to the instructions of a judge all help to ensure that
jurors will carry out their duties impartially. In rare cases, sufficient
proof that these safeguards are not likely to prevent juror bias may
warrant some form of relief being granted under s. 24( 1) of the
Charter. 60

The proper time to challenge the possibility of prejudice to section 11 (d)
rights is at the time of jury selection.
At the conclusion of his section 11 (d) analysis, Cory J. offered
what he entitled "Guidelines for the Commissioner." In this, he
concluded that the testimony of the applicants would run a sufficiently
high risk of prejudicing the accuseds' constitutional right to a fair trial
by jury. Therefore, "the Commissioner could, upon the application of
Roger Parry and Gerald Phillips, consider imposing a ban on the
publication of all or a part of their evidence." 61 Furthermore, the
Commissioner should allow the accuseds to review the final report
before it is made public in order that an application might be entertained
to preclude its release until after the criminal trials have been concluded.
In summarising the possible adverse effects upon the accuseds'
section 11 (d) rights, Cory J. in Phillips closed with the following
"Guidelines":
1.

59
60

Public inquiries often play an important role in satisfying public
interest and concern as to the cause of a tragedy, the safety of

Ibid. at 161.
Ibid. at 169.
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persons involved in the operation of the institution or industry to
be investigated, the nature of the applicable safety regulations,
the governmental enforcement of those regulations and
procedures, and recommendations for the future safety of the
industry or institution.
2.

The right to a fair trial is of fundamental importance and must
always be carefully considered in determining whether Charter
remedies should be granted in order to protect that right.

3.

The importance of public inquiries requires that all persons with
relevant evidence to be given will be subject to subpoena and
compellable to testify as witnesses.

4.

The rights of those witnesses are generally protected by the
provisions of the Charter, particularly ss. 11 (d), 13 and 7.

5.

Not only will the witness have the right not to have the testimony
given used to incriminate him or her, there will also be
protection from the use of"derivative evidence" as provided by
S. (R.J.).

6

Those seeking to have the court ban the publication of evidence
have the burden of establishing the necessity of the ban. That is
to say they must demonstrate that the effect of publicizing the
evidence will be to leave potential jurors in-eparably prejudiced
or so impair the presumption of innocence that a fair trial is
impossible. Before relief is granted in order to preserve the right
to a fair trial, satisfactory proof of the link between the publicity
and its adverse effect must be given.

7.

Assessment of the effect of the publicity on the right to a fair trial
must take place in the context of the existing procedures to
safeguard the selection of jurors. Fmiher, the nature and extent
of the publicity must be considered.

8.

The applicant seeking the ban must establish that there are no
alternative means available to prevent the harm the ban seeks to
prevent.

9.

The remedy should not extend beyond the minimum relief
required to ensure the fair trial of the witness.

10. In some circumstances proceeding with the public inquiry may
so jeopardize the criminal trial of a witness called at the inquiry
that it may be stayed or result in important evidence being held
to be inadmissible at the criminal trial. In those situations it is the
executive branch of government which should make the
decision whether to proceed with the public inquiry. That
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decision should not, except in rare circumstances, be set aside by
a court.
11. If the accused elect trial before a judge alone then pre-trial
publicity will not be a factor to be taken into consideration in
assessing the fairness of the trial. 62

Ultimately, while an application may be more appropriately made at the
time of trial, it is the
individual charged with the conduct of the inquiry [who] is best suited
to assess the potentially harmful effects of evidence introduced at the
inquiry. The judicial use by a commissioner of flexible ad hoc
measures adapted to overcome individual threats to fair trial rights
represents the most efficient means of protecting constitutional rights
during the inquiry process and the criminal proceedings. 63

3. Extra-Legal Effects
The accuseds' interests may be significantly compromised by adverse
findings or intimations of misconduct that might arise before the
inquiry. The public nature of the inquiry's proceedings and the very
intense media interest make any such findings or intimations notorious.
While not as pressing as the section 11 ( d) right to a fair trial, the
individual's reputation and livelihood may be placed in peril.
Edward Ratushny has written on this topic and has concluded that
the procedures of inquiries may imperil the interests of an individual,
leaving him or her with neither appeal nor judicial review to "clear his or
her name." These extra-legal consequences are briefly commented upon
by Stalker, 64 who approves of the use of this discrete category as "[t]he
reactions of society to the findings of a public inqui1y are not within the
control of the govemment."65 She further states:
It is not up to the government to take responsibility for them, even

though the government launched the inquiry that exposed the situation
to the public. If the government decision to establish the inquiry is
legitimate, the fact that it may have consequences beyond the control
of the state on an individual simply becomes one factor to balance in
Ibid. at 160.
Ibid. at 172-74.
63
Ibid. at 181.
64
Stalker, supra note 21 at 431.
65
Ibid.
61
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determining whether the inquiry is an appropriate exercise of
governmental power .... However, it is essential that an inquiry allow
a person, who may be harmed by the information that the inquiry has
uncovered, to respond. If this is done, the fact that a legitimately
established inquiry may have potentially harmful consequences for an
individual is not unfair. 66

Stalker gives the extra-legal interests of the individual in this context
short-shrift. The right to respond and challenge any adverse :findings is
extremely important. But is it enough? The ultimate question is fairness,
both in the criminal trial context, and generally.
The courts would do well to import L 'Heureux-Dube J. 's
"fundamentally unfair" doctrine in this context. 67 The commissioner of
an inquiry has the ultimate obligation to ensure the fairness of the
endeavour. This extends to ensuring that evidence or testimony being
elicited is relevant to the issues in question. While not closely
constrained in the same way as a judicial tribunal, when the inquiry is
considering evidence that may have a detrimental effect upon an
individual, the commissioner should make every effort to ensure that the
questioning stays on track and does not meander into areas of only slight
relevance that might adversely effect individuals in question. This is a
difficult task in a proceeding that is not constrained by the rigid rules of
relevance and where the questioning, of necessity, is less scripted and
more improvised. Nevertheless, if an inquiry takes on the appearance of
an attempt to needlessly slur the reputation of an individual, the
threshold of "fundamentally unfair" has been crossed and the
commissioner has the obligation to rein-in the proceedings.
The danger to reputations is much more acute in the inquiry
context. Unlike trials, where both the Crown and the defendant have
ample time to amass, test, and prepare their cases, inquires do not
operate with such a luxury. Facing the daunting task of amassing and
processing mountains of information, inquiry staff often do not have all
the evidence at their fingertips when preparing for the public hearings.
Nor can they necessarily predict the testimony of individual witnesses.
In contrast to judicial proceedings, the public hearings are usually a
learning experience for the commission, not just a venue to present

66
67

Ibid.
S.(R.J.), supra note 27 at 608-9.
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findings. To use the Westray example, even after the preliminary
investigations and the beginnings of the public hearings, the Inquiry had
no indication that a number of witnesses would be adversely represented
in testimony. In many cases, the adverse representations were surprising
and from the witness' own testimony. 68 In such cases, it would have
been impossible to provide the witnesses with notice and it would have
derailed the inquiry to allow counsel to cross or examine-in-chief, as
such an exercise would have required weeks of preparation. The only
answer, as long as significant interruptions and delays are unacceptable,
would be a system that precludes surprising evidence by thorough
preliminary investigations. 69 Rare cases of surprise that get past the
preliminary investigations can then be dealt with as they emerge.
The Westray Inquiry also offers concrete examples of extra-legal
effects of an inquiry's process. The Nova Scotia provincial Crown has
since withdrawn the criminal charges directed at the mine managers and
the now defunct company. At least three government employees were
dismissed following the Inquiry's report and their reputations have been
thoroughly destroyed. 70 The consequences of adverse findings stretch
well beyond the legal realm and can have a devastating effect upon an
individual's standing in the community. Although legal recourse is
available as a matter of employment law, effects upon reputation can
neither be appealed nor reviewed.
Ultimately, as far as extra-legal consequences are concerned, the
protections offered by the right to answer adverse evidence and the
discretion of the commissioner are sufficient to protect the rights of
individuals. The commissioner must remain aware that legal and extralegal interests are at stake and, often, the extra-legal interests are more
imperilled as there is little possibility of later vindication. As far as is
possible, the inquiry should preclude surprising revelations and should
give ample oppo1iunity for challenges to adverse evidence. It is clear
that on purely collateral matters that are not the subject of criminal

Conversation with John Merrick, Q.C., counsel for the Westray Inquiry.
See the section entitled "Israel," below.
70
Those dismissed are Pat Phelan, Executive Director of Minerals and Energy for the
Department of Natural Resources, Claude White, Director of Mine Safety; and Albe1i
McLean, Mine Inspector. Canadian Press, "Westray Official Loses Job, Another
Reprimanded" (20 April 1998 19:53 EST) DB CP98 (QL).
68
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investigation, the individual has no "right to silence" and answering the
allegations is what is required to protect one's secondaiy, extra-legal
interests.

II. INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES

1. The United States
The regime for the equivalent of public inquiries in the United States is
significantly different from that in Canada. In the tri-partite system of
republican government, the executive and the legislatures can both
spawn inquiries. Congress's powers of investigation derive not from
statute but are "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function" granted in Article I, Section I of the U.S. Constitution. 71 The
Canadian analogue of the Congressional Committee or commission is a
special or standing committee of Parliament, and as in Canada, these
committees are often seen as being tainted by political interests. 72
Nevertheless, the congressional committee is the most prevalent
investigative form in the United States. It is a venue that has witnessed
among the most destructive abuses of individual rights and disregard of
procedural fairness: the Senate Committee on Government Operations
under Senator Joseph McCarthy 73 and the House Un-American
Activities Committee. J. Parnell Thomas, chairperson of the latter
committee, summed up the prevalent attitude toward procedural fairness
when he told an unfortunate witness: "[t]he rights you have are the
rights given to you by this Committee. We will determine what rights
you have and what rights you have not got before the committee." 74
Paitially in response to these abuses, the United States Supreme Court
has made pronouncements regarding the protection of individual
interests before investigative committees of the U.S. Congress on a

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 174 (1926).
Z. Segal, "The Power to Probe Into Matters of Vital Public Importance" (1984) 58 Tu!. L.
Rev. 941 [hereinafter "Matters of Vital Public Importance"].
73
Other famous congressional inquiries have been Teapot Dome, Watergate and, more
recently, the Iran-Contra hearings.
74
Quoted in J. Hamilton, The Power to Probe: A Study of Congressional Investigations
(New York: Random House, 1976) at 247 [hereinafter Power to Probe].
71

72
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number of occasions. Congress is required to respect the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 75 and the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. 76
Furthermore, the Court has also dictated that in the interests of due
process, the Congress must clearly state the scope of its delegated
investigatorial power to the committees. 77 The ability of congressional
committees to investigate matters that might disclose criminal wrongdoing is well established, 78 as is the principle that that the Fifth
Amendment provides a right to refuse to testify on the grounds that the
testimony might incriminate the witness. 79
The law in the United States is clearly in favour of the notion that
"the public has the right to every [person's] evidence." 80 The
exception-a very broad exception by Canadian standards-to this
wide mle of compellability is a
limited privilege ofrefusing to testify as to matters which may lead the
testifier to jail. Since the only consequence which the privilege against
self-incrimination avoids is a criminal prosecution, if government
promises in advance not to prosecute, then one has no right to remain
silent. 81

Thus, in order to get such testimony before the committee, a system
providing "use and derivative use immunity" has been devised. 82
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1954). See also, 98 C.J.S. Witnesses§ 450.
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 at 382-83 (1960).
77
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 201 (1956). See generally, L. Boudin,
"Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses" (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev.
143; M. Shapiro, "Judicial Review: Political Reality and Legislative Purpose: The Supreme
Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations" (1962) 15 Vand. L. Rev. 535.
78
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263
(1929); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
79
See note 82, infi·a.
80
The Sixth Amendment gives the criminally accused person the right to "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favour."
81
D. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights Today (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976)
at 325-26.
82
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (Immunity generally), provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to
(I) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
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Immunity is not granted by the committee per se, but by the Federal
Court upon the request of two-thirds of the committee. The Attorney
General can simultaneously pursue a criminal charge before immunity
is granted, but the executive cannot prevent the award. Nevertheless,
once the threat of imprisonment is removed, the witness no longer has
any ground to refuse to testify.
The immunity granted by the U.S. Congress has had a varied and
interesting history. 83 Beginning in 1857, Congress passed its first
immunity law to protect those who appeared before it. 84 The statute was
worded so broadly that it resulted in "immunity baths" whereby
witnesses confessed to all their misdeeds before congressional
committees (whatever the relevance to the business at hand) and
automatically received permanent immunity from prosecution. 85 The
statute was tightened up in 1862 to produce a scheme known as "simple
use" immunity. The new system was strnck down in 1892 as contrary to
the Fifth Amendment because it did not protect against the derivative
use of compelled testimony. To be valid, immunity granted by Congress
must "afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offence to which the question relates." 86 Returning to the drawingboard, Congress fashioned the "transactional" use immunity statute that
stood until 1970. Facing mounting criticism that congressional
immunity grants were resulting in too many aborted prosecutions, the
Congress enacted the "use and derivative use" scheme in place today.
When challenged in Kastigar v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the law and stated that the earlier "transactional use" immunity
was overbroad in protecting Fifth Amendment rights. 87 From a practical

and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued
under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
83
For an interesting historical perspective, see R.S. Ghio, "The Iran-Contra Prosecutions
and the Failure of Use Immunity" (1992) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 229.
84
Act of 14 January 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155-56.
85 K. Strachan, "Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate" (1978) 56 Tex. L. Rev. 791
at 797-98.
86
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 at 586 (1892).
87
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441at462 (1972).
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point of view, Kastigar places an affirmative duty on the government at
the subsequent prosecution to prove that all of its evidence to be
adduced against the past witness/present defendant is legitimate and
derived at independently from the compelled testimony. 88 The law of
1970 has not lived up to expectations. The high hurdle of the special
evidentiary hearing has effectively barred prosecutions. 89 The "use and
derivative use immunity" has, in function, become more akin to
transactional immunity.
Unlike Canada and the United Kingdom, the United States has
little tradition of ad hoc executive inquiries. Among the most famous,
high-profile inquiry commissions were the Warren Commission
charged with the investigation of the assassination of President
Kennedy, the Roberts Commissions investigating the surprise attack at
Pearl Harbour, and the investigation into the Space Shuttle Challenger
Disaster. Most modem executive bodies are governed by the Federal
Advisory Conimittee Act, 90 which is a statute that does not confer any
special powers upon committees constituted by the President.
Nevertheless, in the rare instances where such a committee is
investigating criminal activity, the immunity provisions noted above,
embodied in Title 18 of the United States Code, also apply to the
executive mm of American govemment. 91 Thus, an inquiry staged by a
government agency can seek immunity for a witness on the same basis
allowed for congressional committees.
2. The United Kingdom
In England there is a general rule that if Parliament has established a
public inquiry to investigate a matter of public concern, no matter what
comes out of the inquiry, charges will not be laid. As a general rule
witnesses who testified at an inquiry are given immunity from
prosecution. 92

Jbid.; Strachan, supra note 85 at 818.
For example, see the failed prosecutions of Oliver North and John Poindexter following
the Iran-Contra Hearings: United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For an interesting analysis of the immunityrelated fall-out of the hearings, see R.F. Wright, "Congressional Use oflmmunity Grants After
Iran-Contra" (1995) 80 Minn. L. Rev. 407.
90
5 U.S.C. App. 1.
91
18 u.s.c. § 6001.
92
Phillips (N.S.C.A.), supra note 7 at 247.
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This pos1t10n in Great Britain came about following the Royal
Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, chaired by Salmon L.J. 93 The
government constituted the Salmon Commission following a number of
unpleasant investigations that caused a public outcry:
The [Tribunals of Inquily (Evidence)] Act, which came onto the
statute book in a curiously unpremeditated fashion, created a formal
instrument of compulsmy interrogation with a censmial jurisdiction of
some potency ....
Yet these powers are exercised without the protection offered by
normal rules of procedure, no charges are preferred, there is no
justicable dispute between the parties, ordinary rules of evidence and
relevance do not apply throughout. It is like a powerful locomotive
running without rails. 94

Salmon L.J. considered the lack of procedural protections and identified
what he called "the six cardinal principles" to "largely remove the
difficulty and injustice with which persons involved in an inquiry may
be faced":
1.

Before any person becomes involved in an inquiry, the Tribunal
must be satisfied that there are circumstances which affect him
and which the Tribunal proposes to investigate.

2.

Before any person who is involved in an inquiry is called as a
witness he should be informed of any allegations which are
made against him and the substance of the evidence in support of
them.

3.

(a) He should be given an adequate opportunity of preparing his
case and of being assisted by legal advisers.
(b )His legal expenses should normally be met out of public
funds.

4.

93

He should have the opportunity of be examined by his own
solicitor or counsel and of stating his case in public at the
inquiry.

Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inqui1y, Report of the Commission under the
Chairmanship of The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Salmon (London: HMSO, 1966) [hereinafter
Salmon Commission].
94
Editorial, (26 April 1963) The Times (London); quoted in R.E. Wraith & G.B. Lamb,
Public Inquiries as an Instrument ofGovemment (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1971) at 214
[hereinafter Public Inquiries].
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5.

Any material witnesses he wishes called at the inquiry should, if
reasonably practicable, be heard.

6.

He should have the opportunity of testing by cross-examination
conducted by his own solicitor or counsel any evidence which
may affect him. 95

Salmon L.J. identified many defects with the existing Tribunals of
Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 19 21 and his report contained fifty
recommendations. 96 In the years since the Salmon Report, the Act has
not been amended though the intention to do so was announced in 1973,
seven years following the report of the Commission's findings in
1966. 97
Though the Salmon Rep01i's recommendations did not result in
amendments to the Act, the practice of providing immunity to witnesses
who appear before Tribunals of Inqui1y coupled with the much more
limited use of such tribunals respond effectively to the desire to protect
the interests of those who might be investigated.
Of paiiicular note in this context is that inquiries of the sort allowed
under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921 are, compared to
Canada, very rare indeed. In their 1971 monograph, Wraith and Lamb
cite that only sixteen Tribunals of Inquiry had been constituted in that
first fifty years of the Act. 98 Many investigations which would most
likely be undertaken by public inquiries in Canada are still undertaken
by "inside investigations" and ad hoc judicial investigations with few of
the powers of tribunals of inquiry. Nevertheless, calls for tribunals
under the 1921 Act are common in Great Britain, as is criticism of the
prevalent form of inquiry. 99
Salmon Commission, supra note 93 at 17-18.
Ibid. at 44-47.
97
Government Views 011 Commission of Tribunals of Inquiry and the Interdepartmental
Committee on the Lmvof Contempt as It Affects Tribunals ofInquily, CMD., No. 5313 (1973)
(presented to Parliament in May 1973), cited in "Matters of Vital Public Importance," supra
note 72 at 943.
98
Public Inquiries, supra note 94 at 212.
99
See D.I.B. Body, "Letter: BSE Inquiry" (3 Dec. 1997) The Independent; V. Elliott, "Blair
and Ashdown Urge Full Inquiry on Hamilton" (9 Oct. 1996) The Times (London); A. Watkins
"Major Asked the Question; Now He's Got the Answer They Cannot Complain That This is a
Probe Too Far" (11 Feb. 1996) The Independent 12; E. Symons "Letter: Leaks, Gags and Trial
by Media" (8 June 1995) The Times (London); C. Brown & N. Cohen, "The Arms for Iraq
Scandal: Judicial Inquiry Condemned as Weak" (11 Nov. 1992) The Independent 3; V.
Bogdanor, "Whitewash or Witch-hunt?" (3 Dec. 1992) The Times (London).
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3. Israel
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Lord Justice Salmon's fifty
recommendations were most closely heeded in Israel. Shortly after
presenting his report, Salmon L.J. lectured on the subject at the Law
Faculty of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. 100 Not long thereafter, in
1968, the Israeli Knesset passed a Commission ofInquiry Law, 101 mostly
based upon Britain's 1921 Tribunals ofInquiry (Evidence) Act, but also
incorporating many of Salmon's recommendations.
In Israel, as in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
the decision of whether to launch a public inquiry rests with the
govemment. 102 But the decision of who to appoint has been taken from
the hands of the politicians and vested in the President of the Supreme
Court. This provides the public with a large measure of confidence at
least with regard to the independence of the commission. Furthermore,
the Israeli Law requires that the chair of the commission be a judge of
either the Supreme Court or of a district comi. 103 With regard to
witnesses, the Israeli system provides additional imp01iant safeguards.
Salmon L.J. recommended that witness immunity be extended,
precluding the use of either oral or documentary evidence at any
subsequent litigation. 104 As in the U.K. and Canada, Israeli witnesses
enjoy no privilege against giving self-incriminating testimony. Thus,
the testimony is compelled with the promise of later protection.
The Israeli model is also remarkable because of additional
structural and procedural safeguards that further protect the interests of
witnesses. The process of inquiry is divided into two paiis. The first is a
basic investigation for the commissioners to "form a preliminary picture
of the matter being investigated and of the identity of the persons who
seem to be involved." 105 The second part forms the bulk of the
investigation. Following the preliminary investigation, the commission
will issue notices to those who might be adversely affected by the

Published as C. Salmon, "Tribunals oflnquiry" (1967) 2 Isr. L. Rev. 313.
23 Laws of the State ofisrael 32 (1968), am. by 26 Laws of the State ofisrael 30 (1972),
and 33 Laws of the State oflsrael 100 (1979) [hereinafter Israeli Law].
102
Following Salmon's recommendation, Salmon Commission, supra note 93 at 29.
103
Following Salmon's recommendation, ibid.
104
Israeli Law, supra note 101 at s. 19.1
105
"Matters of Vital Public Importance," supra note 72 at 965.
100

101

86 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

commission or its findings. 106 Those persons will be presented with any
relevant documents and will be able appear before the commission
either in person or via counsel. In addition, the Israeli regime also
provides the right to examine witnesses before the commission, even if
those witnesses have previously testified.
The bifurcated Israeli model is similar in arrangement to what is
commonly the informal norm in Canada. Before the formal public
hearings, inquiry staff assemble and investigate the basic contours of the
inquiry to establish the parameters of the undertaking. Following this
investigation, the commissioners would have an idea of who to summon
and what their general line of inquiry will be. Additionally, in the
federal context, it would be at this point that section 13 107 notices would
be issued to those against whom an adverse finding might be made. The
Israeli model formalizes and mandates what has become a commonbut discretionary-practice in federal inquiries.
In considering the possibility of parallel inquiry and criminal
processes, Salmon L.J.'s report recommended that the traditional
immunities enjoyed by witnesses be extended so that
neither the evidence before the Tribunal, nor his statement to the
Treasury Solicitor, nor any documents he is required to produce to the
Tribunal, shall be used against him in any subsequent civil or criminal
proceedings except in criminal proceedings in which he is charged
with having given false evidence before the Tribunal or conspired with
or procured others to do so. [emphasis added] 108

As mentioned above, the Israeli Law followed Salmon L.J. 's
recommendations and under section 12, neither compelled testimony
nor compelled documents may be admitted into evidence at a
subsequent proceeding against that person. This provision is well
beyond what is the practice in Canada.

Similar to the notice provisions of Canada's Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11, s. 13.
Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11, s. 13.
108 Salmon Commission, supra note 93 at 26. While Salmon L.J. wrote that the
recommendation would bring Great Britain's law "into line in this respect with similar
provisions in the legislation of Canada," it should be noted that neither the Canada Evidence
Act nor the Charter provide protection against the subsequent use of compelled documents.
106
107
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4. Lessons to be Learned Internationally
Limited use immunity represented by Israel's process is similar to that
in Canada today, with one very important distinction: the prohibition
against the subsequent use of compelled documents. Even ifthe witness
were liable to be criminally prosecuted or civilly sued on the facts that
gave rise to the founding of the commission, this documentary
preclusion effectively eliminates what would be the most important
trove of evidence for that proceeding. Most of the protections offered to
witnesses are to prevent the inquiry from damaging the individual's
right by its extraordinary powers. (For example, an inquiry can compel
testimony from a person suspected of a crime while a criminal
proceeding cannot.) In Canada, an ordinary criminal or civil proceeding
can compel the production of any documents in the possession of the
defendant. An exercise of such power by the inquiry would not be
extraordinary, in contrast to the power to compel oral testimony. A
subsequent use prohibition would be excessive and would impair any
subsequent litigation disproportionately compared to the possible
prejudice. Of course, if in any particular instance compelling the
documents would be unfairly prejudicial, the overseeing judge would be
within his or her discretion as the overseer of trial fairness to disallow its
admission.
When considering other possible lessons for Canada that can be
drawn from the Israeli and United Kingdom experience, it must be
remembered that in Canada the public inquiry is a much more prevalent
form of public investigation. In the former two countries, the public
inquiry is a tool reserved for when matters "of vital public importance
[need] clarification or investigation to avert a nationwide crisis of
confidence." Canada's use of the public inquiry shows that it has
become one of the hallmarks of our modem administrative state, used to
investigate a wide range of matters. It is not reserved only for
circumstances that might topple the government or destroy public
confidence. Events that might be the subject of more routine
administrative examination in the U.S., the U.K., or Israel are
commonly put under the public looking glass in Canada. A blanket
prohibition against subsequent (or concurrent) criminal prosecutions or
civil actions would be excessive unless Canada adopted the stance of
only launching inquiries in cases of dramatic crisis. The public inquiry
has become an important part of the Canadian administrative landscape
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and much would be lost if the bar was moved that high. As government
and public cynicism have grown over the last decades, periodic
impartial examinations of "the system" are important to maintain
confidence in government institutions.
Assuming that the threshold level for the calling of a public inquiry
remains roughly the same, there will be few instances where the public
interest clearly calls for a preclusion of all criminal and civil
consequences so that systemic or administrative problems might be
solved. Very seldom will the issue be amenable to a bright-line test. The
balancing of the public interests served by inquiries against the public
interests served by prosecutions will require, in the Canadian context,
finer balancing. When individual criminality and systemic neglect
converge, administrative investigation and criminal prosecution-if
properly balanced-can complement one another. Inflexible rules of
evidence should not be crafted to automatically preclude that
possibility.
As mentioned, the Israeli model uses a bifurcated approach,
beginning with an infonnal investigation followed by the issuance of
notices of possible adverse findings, followed by the public hearings.
This model formalizes what happens unofficially in most public
inquiries in Canada, but mandated rigidity should not be imported to the
Canadian context. That the practice occurs in Canada suggests that it is
an approach that works. That it would also preclude many "surprises"
on the stand and would provide counsel with greater background before
beginning the public hearings further underscores the benefit.
Nevertheless, mandating such a structure would impair the ability of the
inquiry to change directions and investigate new allegations as they
come to light during the public phase. Emphasis should be placed on
preliminary investigations without limiting the flexibility that Canadian
inquiries enjoy during the public hearings. Both can be achieved without
statutory re-adjustments.

III. CONCLUSION
Royal Commissions and public inquiries are ideal tools to investigate
circumstances of immense public importance that fall into the "grey
areas" between the government and the judiciary. In such cases,
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however, the possibility is very real that the rights of individuals may be
significantly jeopardized in the legitimate search for the truth. Every
step of the process is fraught with peril to individuals, and careful
balancing should be used to minimize the possible harm to individuals
while allowing properly constituted inquiries to do their job. The
existing jurisprudence is not entirely clear or instructive and there are
certainly many areas where Canada might learn from foreign examples.
Wholesale reform is not recommended as the present system,
shepherded by diligent political leaders, commissioners, inquiry
counsel, and judges, can accomplish the difficult balancing required.
Of course, the very first step is asking the question of whether or
not an inquiry is even necessary. In cases where facts surrounding a
particular incident can be exposed or dealt with through the nonnal
judicial process, the effort and expense of an inqui1y is not warranted.
Further, it is only in those circumstances where the normal tools of
investigation and justice will not adequately serve the public interest
that the public inquiry should be used. The powerful fact-finding
machinery of the Royal Commission must not be unleashed unless it is
to establish the facts about a matter of material public importance. The
bar should not be as high as it is in the U.K. or in Israel, but the cost,
expense, and possible danger to individual rights should limit its use.
Whether or not a criminal trial might be foreseeable is not relevant at
such a stage, because the value being judged is whether or not there is
sufficient public interest served by convening a public inquiry. If the
matter can be properly investigated by existing investigative bodies, or
by an "indoor investigation," there is no need to engage the Inquiries
Acts because the exercise would be superfluous.
Considering the establishment of a public inquiry examining a
subject that might also have the possibility of criminal charges will
necessarily involve a careful consideration of the possible interchange
between the two processes. The question must be asked whether the
public interest demands that one take precedence over the other. Is the
public best served by deten-ence and punishment, or by careful public
investigation of systemic and individual shortcoming? Is the
government willing to abide the possible derailing of any criminal
charges in the pursuit of the truth, or is the mission of the public inquiry
so important that absolute immunity should be granted so that it may
proceed without any hindrance? These are difficult questions to put to
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the political leadership and the strong public pressure following a
disaster or in the midst of scandal are not conducive to clear, rational,
and long-range thinking. Nevertheless, to the extent that they can be
answered, they must be. The decision to proceed with an inquiry must be
made with the knowledge that if it proceeds prior to, or in parallel with,
a criminal prosecution, the criminal proceeding may be jeopardized.
Once the government has inaugurated an inquiry, the
commissioner (or commissioners) is the master of the inquiry's process
and is ultimately responsible for conducting the inquiry in a fair and
even-handed way. When criminal charges are either a reality or a
possibility, that responsibility takes on an even greater significance as
the inquiry may be jeopardized, delayed, or otherwise hindered by
allegations of unfairness or possible prejudice to the rights of those who
are the subject of criminal investigation. At every step of the way, the
rights of those persons must be carefully considered, particularly with
regard to compulsion to testify and the possibility of undermining the
fairness of subsequent trials.
When considering compelling the testimony of a person who might
be the object of a criminal investigation, the commissioner should
follow the principled approach that balances the value of a person's
testimony to the inquiry against the possibility of prejudice. If the
inquiry is able to fulfil its mandate without the testimony of the potential
accused, then that person should not be compelled to testify. However,
since any evaluation of future prejudice at this stage is necessarily
speculative, the commissioner should consider probabilities of
prejudice, not mere possibilities. Furthermore, if a possible witness has
only a tangential connection to the instant proceeding and the possibility
exists that the information brought before the inquiry will be of greater
assistance to the criminal prosecution than to the inquiry, that person
should be excused from testifying as the "fundamentally unfair"
threshold will be crossed. Perceptions-accurate or not-that an inquiry
is a substitute or adjunct police investigation must be avoided.
In addition, as the guardian of this process, the commissioner
should consider what steps he or she can take to minimize any adverse
publicity that might impair the possibility of a fair trial for the accuseds.
A minority of the Supreme Court of Canada has offered clear guidance
for such a situation. 109 When an accused will be tried before a judge
109

Phillips (S.C.C.), supra note 9.
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alone, adverse publicity will have no affect upon his or her section 11 (d)
rights. The situation is more complicated when the accused has opted
for a trial by jury or has not yet made the choice. Only in the clearest of
cases will a stay of the inquiry's process be necessary or desirable.
Otherwise, the proper place to seek a remedy for a section 11 ( d) breach
is before the trial judge. Nevertheless, the commissioner can take steps
to minimize any possible prejudice that might abort the future
prosecution. Publication bans on the testimony of the accused or a delay
in releasing the final report until after the trial are possible responses.
Although the commissioner is ultimately responsible for the inquiry, he
or she should take whatever steps are necessary to preserve the fairness
of both the inquiry and any subsequent trials.
Among the greatest dangers to an accused is the general
admissibility of derivative evidence. The legal doctrine that underlies
Charter section 13 and the provincial evidence acts is that a person must
testify if compelled because protections against self-incrimination will
be offered subsequently. The jurisprudence in this area is mostly based
on intercepted communications and illegally obtained confessions, and
has simply been transferred to the inquiry cases. The situation presented
by an examination by experienced inqui1y counsel covers a much
broader range of evidence while probing much more than a conscripted
confession. Furthermore, the incriminating information is extracted
from the suspect under the threat of imprisonment. Precluding the
Crown from using derivative evidence in trial would provide the
accused with a greater incentive to cooperate with the inquiry and, in the
process, the Crown would be no further behind than they would be in a
normal prosecution. The present state of the law does not agree.
Therefore, the greatest protection presently offered is the oversight of
the inquiry's commissioner and a commitment to ensure that the inquiry
does not inadvertently stray beyond what is relevant and absolutely
essential to the inquiry.
A commissioner is primarily responsible for his or her inquiry.
Although the fairness of a future trial is not the paramount
consideration, it must be at the forefront in any decision to compel
testimony from a person who may later be a criminal defendant. Public
inquiries are necessarily public and testimony is often well reported.
Statements made during public hearings and conclusions drawn in the
final report can subve1i a defendant's section 11 ( d) right to a fair trial by
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undermining the ability to empanel an unbiased jury. Though remedy
for infringements of this right, except in the clearest of cases, should be
sought at the time of trial, the commissioner can and should play a role
in minimizing the potential harm.
The commissioner also has a duty to protect, as far as is possible,
witnesses from collateral, adverse extra-legal consequences. There is
little doubt that, along the continuum of collateral effects, extra-legal
consequences do not weigh as heavily as section 7 or 11 (d) violations.
But Charter violations are amenable to judicial remedies. There is no
appeal for a destroyed reputation or career, though the results can be just
as damaging as a criminal conviction. Just as with derivative evidence,
above, the commissioner has a duty to ensure that, as far as possible,
reputations are not unfairly destroyed. Of course, it must be remembered
that an unenviable reputation can be well-deserved. It is unfair damage
to reputations that must be guarded against.
Additionally, Canada and the provinces can learn much from the
experience overseas. The British doctrine that precludes any criminal
prosecutions arising from the same subject as a public inquiry merits
serious consideration. Ultimately it is the government that must decide
whether to call an inquiry and whether to proceed with criminal charges.
An "either/or regime" would finnly place the onus upon the politicians
to evaluate the public interests served by both processes and to decide
which would be the most compelling. Canadian governments, compared
with those of Great Britain, are much less hesitant to call for an inquiry.
If criminal charges were automatically precluded with the activation of
the inquiry, authorities would likely become less likely to form
inquiries. As a consistent aspect of Canadian government, raising the
threshold for calling inquiries would undermine the investigatory
institution without promising increased returns in individual rights.
The Israeli example, even more so than the British, bears particular
scrutiny. The mandatory two-part investigation is compelling. It ensures
that commissioners and inquiry staff have a firm foundation in the facts
of the case. This precludes many surprises and provides the opportunity
to give notice to most of those against whom adverse findings might be
made. On the other hand, Canada should not imitate the automatic
preclusion against subsequent production of any documents that are
compelled before an inquiry. Such a rule would prevent a criminal court
from having access to real evidence to which they are entitled,
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regardless of the presence of an inquiry. The independent existence and
compellability of such documents are unquestioned in Canadian law.
The Israeli exclusion is a blanket prohibition that should not be
imported.
Public inquiries are a very important part of Canada's
administrative state. They are extremely effective tools for ferreting out
the truth and for shining a bright light on government operations. Lately,
however, inquiries have been the targets of expensive and timeconsuming litigation by people who may subsequently be criminally
charged for conduct that is also at the root of the inquiry's investigation.
The law in this area, despite considerable litigation, remains unsettled.
This is particularly so because the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada declined to fully consider the issues that had been raised before
it in Phillips. 110 Nevertheless, future commissioners can see the
measures that they might take to minimize adverse side effects, and thus
minimize litigation and delays that hamper their investigations.
Importantly, politicians can give leadership and guidance to the system
of inquiries through their decisions of whether and when to call an
inquiry and whether to give the inquiry absolute priority over criminal
charges. Canada has a rich history of public inquiries, but there is still
much we can learn from the experience of Israel, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
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